Abstract. Projecting bilinear pairings have frequently been used for designing cryptosystems since they were first derived from composite order bilinear groups. There have been only a few studies on the (im)possibility of projecting bilinear pairings. Groth and Sahai (EUROCRYPT 2008) showed that projecting bilinear pairings can be achieved in a prime-order group setting. They constructed both projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings and projecting symmetric bilinear pairings, where a bilinear pairing e is symmetric if it satisfies e(g, h) = e(h, g) for any group elements g and h; otherwise, it is asymmetric. Subsequently, Freeman (EUROCRYPT 2010) generalized Groth-Sahai's projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings.
Introduction
A bilinear group is a tuple of abelian groups with a non-degenerate bilinear pairing. Projecting bilinear pairings, which are bilinear pairings with homomorphisms that satisfy a commutative property, have frequently been used for designing cryptosystems since they were first derived from composite order bilinear groups [10] , though Freeman identified and named the projecting property recently [15] . Of special interest is the GrothSahai non-interactive proof system [22] and the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [10] , both of which essentially use the projecting property and have numerous applications in various fields in cryptography. For example, the Groth-Sahai proofs were used to construct ring signatures [13] , group signatures [19] , round optimal blind signatures [25] , verifiable shuffles [20] , a universally composable adaptive oblivious transfer protocol [18] , a group encryption scheme [12] , anonymous credentials [7, 6] , and malleable proof systems [14] . For its part, the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem was used for designing private searching on streaming data [31] , non-interactive zero-knowledge [21] , shuffling [5] , and privacy-preserving set operations [32] .
(Im)possibility of Projecting Bilinear Pairings: Although the projecting bilinear pairings are often used for designing various cryptosystems, there have been only a few studies on the (im)possibility of projecting bilinear pairings. Groth and Sahai [22] demonstrated that projecting bilinear pairings can be achieved in a prime-order group setting. They provided two distinct constructions in the prime-order group setting: projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings and projecting symmetric bilinear pairings, where a bilinear pairing e is symmetric if it satisfies e(g, h) = e(h, g) for any group elements g and h; otherwise, it is asymmetric. On the basis of this idea of projecting bilinear pairings, they developed non-interactive proof systems for quadratic equations over modules that can be instantiated in composite-order bilinear groups, product groups of prime-order bilinear groups with asymmetric bilinear pairings, and product groups of primeorder groups with symmetric bilinear pairings. By extending Groth-Sahai's idea, Freeman [15] generalized Groth-Sahai's projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings in the prime-order group setting. 1 Groth-Sahai and Freeman's constructions of projecting bilinear pairings allow for the simultaneous treatment of subgroup indistinguishability. To use projecting bilinear pairings for designing cryptographic protocols, we need to deal with cryptographic assumptions such as subgroup decision assumption at the same time. Meiklejohn, Shacham, and Freeman [25] have shown some impossibility results for projecting bilinear pairings in the prime-order group setting, e.g., that projecting bilinear pairings cannot simultaneously have a cancelling property if the subgroup indistinguishability is naturally induced from the k-linear assumption [23, 36] . Recently, Seo and Cheon [35] proved that bilinear pairings can be simultaneously projecting and cancelling when the subgroup decision assumption holds in the generic group model. 
Contribution:
In this paper, our contribution is a two-fold. First, we aim to answer the fundamental question how efficient constructions for projecting bilinear pairings can be. Second, we propose a construction of projecting symmetric bilinear pairings that can achieve the efficiency of our lower bounds and then provide several constructions of cryptosystems based on the proposal in a modular fashion.
We focus on constructions only in the prime-order bilinear group setting since this type of group usually supports more efficient (group and bilinear pairing) operations than those in composite-order bilinear groups (see [15] for a detailed comparison of composite and prime-order groups). We present several impossibility results of the projecting bilinear pairings in a prime-order group setting. More precisely, we specify the lower bound of 1. the image size of a projecting asymmetric bilinear pairing 2. the image size of a projecting symmetric bilinear pairing 3. the computational cost for a projecting asymmetric bilinear pairing, and 4. the computational cost for a projecting symmetric bilinear pairing in a prime-order group setting naturally induced from the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption, the decisional linear (DLIN) assumption, and the k-linear assumption, where the computational cost means the number of generic operations. In this paper, we restrict ourselves to a consideration of a framework in which the subgroup indistinguishability in the framework relies in a natural way on simple assumptions (i.e., the DDH, DLIN, and k-linear assumption). This framework covers all previous constructions by Groth-Sahai and Freeman, and this restriction on the framework has already been used in [25] to show another impossibility result on projecting bilinear pairings. As for the computational cost of projecting bilinear pairings, we consider a slightly restricted computational model since there are typically several ways to perform a given operation, which makes it very difficult to compare all possible (even unknown) ways. We have two basic assumptions in our computational model. First, we only count the number of generic operations of the underlying elliptic curve group and the pairings − that is, we assume that one cannot utilize information about the representation of groups and bilinear pairing operations [37, 8] . Second, we assume that two inputs of a projecting bilinear pairing are uniformly and independently chosen. In special cases, an additional information about two inputs may lead to an efficient alternative way of computing a pairing operation. For example, when one computes e(g 1 , g 2 ) for the two given inputs g 1 and g 2 , where e : G × G → G t is a pairing, if we knows e(g, g), a 1 and a 2 such that g 1 = g a1 and g 2 = g a2 for a generator g of G, then we can perform one field multiplication and one exponentiation in G t instead of performing e for e(g 1 , g 2 ) = e(g, g)
a1a2 . Since we want to consider the computational cost of e in general, that is, without any additional information aside from the original two inputs, we assume that two inputs are uniformly and independently distributed in their respective domains: Hence, our computational model rules out special cases like the above example. Although our computational model does not perfectly correspond to the real world, we believe that its lower computational bounds can aid our understanding of the projecting property and enable us to locate efficient constructions for projecting bilinear pairings.
In this study, our lower bounds imply that Freeman's construction of projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings is optimal [15] : that is, it is the most efficient construction for projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings in our framework and computational model. In contrast, our lower bounds for a projecting symmetric bilinear pairing are different from those of Groth-Sahai [22] . We fill these gaps by constructing projecting symmetric bilinear pairings and demonstrating that our construction can achieve an efficiency coincident with the lower bounds.
The proposed projecting symmetric bilinear pairings can be used to create more efficient instantiations of cryptosystems, which essentially use projecting property and symmetric bilinear pairings, in a modular fashion. To show that the proposed projecting symmetric bilinear pairings can be adapted to various cryptosystems, we apply them to three distinct cryptosystems and create new efficient instantiations of the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system [22] , the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [10] , and the Seo-Cheon round optimal blind signatures [35] that are provably secure under the DLIN assumption. 3 The proposed instantiation of the non-interactive proof system has a faster verification than the Groth-Sahai's instantiation based on the DLIN assumption, and the proposed instantiation of the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem has a smaller ciphertext size and a faster decryption algorithm than the Freeman's instantiation based on the DLIN assumption. We can also reduce the verification costs of the Seo-Cheon round optimal blind signatures. These applications are of independent interest. Our new instantiation is based on the DLIN assumption so that we can improve the efficiency of all subsequent protocols using the Groth-Sahai's instantiation 3 (based on the DLIN assumption).
We should note here that symmetric bilinear pairings require the use of supersingular elliptic curves and thus the associated bilinear groups are larger than those with asymmetric bilinear pairings using ordinary curves (please see [16] for a detailed comparison). However, some constructions of pairing-based cryptosystems essentially use the symmetric property of bilinear pairings (e.g., Groth-Ostrovsky-Sahai zero-knowledge proofs [21] ). Therefore, the proposed projecting symmetric bilinear pairings can be used for designing such cryptosystems.
Modular Approach in Cryptography:
Generally speaking, a modular approach for cryptosystems leads to a simple design but inefficient constructions in comparison to an ad hoc approach. Recently, we have found a few exceptions for structure preserving cryptography [1, 2, 11] and mathematical structures [26, 27] . Structure preserving schemes enable one to construct modular protocols while preserving conceptual simplicity and yielding reasonable efficiency at the same time. Structure-preserving signatures, commitments [1] , and encryptions [11] restrict all components in schemes to group elements, so schemes can easily be combined with Groth-Sahai proofs [22] . In a modular fashion, round optimal blind signatures, group signatures, and anonymous proxy signatures can be derived from structure preserving signatures, and oblivious trusted third parties can be achieved due to the structure preserving encryptions. There has been some impossibility results for structure preserving cryptography [2] [3] [4] . These save our efforts in terms of impossible goals and widen our understanding regarding modular constructions.
Okamoto and Takashima [26] introduced a mathematical structure called "dual pairing vector spaces" that can be instantiated using a product of bilinear groups or a Jacobian variety of a supersingular curve of genus ≥ 1. On the basis of these dual pairing vector spaces, a homomorphic encryption scheme [26] , functional encryption scheme [27, 28, 30] , attribute-based signature scheme [29] , and (hierarchical) identitybased encryption scheme [24] have been proposed.
Open Problem: It would be interesting to extend the (im)possibility of the projecting property into a wider framework than ours. Furthermore, finding other applications of projecting pairings is also interesting.
Road Map: In Section 2, we give definitions for bilinear groups, projecting property, and cryptographic assumptions. In Section 3, we explain our impossibility results of projecting bilinear pairings. In Section 4, we show the optimality of Groth-Sahai and Freeman's projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings and give our construction for optimal projecting symmetric bilinear pairings. In Section 5, we apply the proposed projecting symmetric bilinear pairings to three distinct cryptosystems, the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system, the Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem, and the Seo-Cheon round optimal blind signatures.
Definition
We use notation x $ ← A to mean that, if A is a finite group G, an element x is uniformly chosen from G, and, if A is an algorithm, A outputs x by using its own random coins. We use [i, j] to denote a set of integers {i, . . . , j}, g 1 , . . . , g n to denote a group generated by g 1 , . . . , g n , and F p to denote a finite field of prime order p. For a map τ : T D → T R , and any subset
All values in our paper are outputs of some functions taking the security parameter λ and ≈ denotes the difference between both sides is a negligible function in λ.
We use two commonly used mathematical notations internal direct sum, denoted by ⊕, and tensor product (Kronecker product), denoted by ⊗. For an abelian group G, if G 1 and G 2 are subgroups of G such that
is a m 1 × m 2 matrix and B = (b i,j ) is an 1 × 2 matrix, the tensor product A ⊗ B is the m 1 1 × m 2 2 matrix whose (i, j)-th block is a i,j B, where we consider A ⊗ B as m 1 × m 2 blocks. That is,
We use several properties of the internal direct sum and tensor product. Every element g in G has a unique representation if G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 . That is, g ∈ G can be uniquely written as g = g 1 g 2 for some g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 . If two matrices A and B are invertible, then A ⊗ B is also invertible and the inverse is given by (A ⊗ B)
The transposition operation is distributive over the tensor product. That is, (A ⊗ B) t = A t ⊗ B t . We sometimes consider a vector over F p as a matrix with one row.
Bilinear Groups and Projecting Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1 Let G be an algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ. We say that G is a bilinear group generator if G outputs a description of five finite abelian groups (G, G 1 , H, H 1 , and G t ) and a map e such that G 1 ⊂ G, H 1 ⊂ H, and e : G × H → G t is a non-degenerate bilinear pairing; that is, it satisfies
• Bilinearity: e(g 1 g 2 , h 1 h 2 ) = e(g 1 , h 1 )e(g 1 , h 2 )e(g 2 , h 1 )e(g 2 , h 2 ) for g 1 , g 2 ∈ G and h 1 , h 2 ∈ H, • Non-degeneracy: for g ∈ G, if e(g, h) = 1 ∀h ∈ H, then g = 1. Similarly, for h ∈ H, if e(g, h) = 1 ∀g ∈ G, then h = 1.
In addition, we assume that group operations in each group (G, H, and G t ), bilinear pairing computations, random samplings from each group, and membership-check in each group are efficiently computable (i.e., polynomial time in λ).
If the order of output groups of G is prime p, we call G a bilinear group generator of prime order and say
; that is, G, H and G t are finite abelian groups of prime order p. If G = H, G 1 = H 1 , and e(g, h) = e(h, g) for all g, h ∈ G, we say that G is symmetric. Otherwise, we say that G is asymmetric.
We define the projecting property of a bilinear pairings.
Definition 2 Let G be a bilinear group generator, and G $ → (G, G 1 , H, H 1 , G t , e) . We say that G is projecting if there exist a subgroup G t ⊂ G t and three homomorphisms π : G → G,π : H → H, and π t : G t → G t such that
If G is symmetric, set π =π.
Note that in Definition 2 we slightly revised Freeman's original projecting definition to fit our purpose. First, we added a requirement for homomorphisms to be non-trivial (first condition of Definition 2). If we allowed trivial homomorphisms, they would satisfy the projecting property. Since trivial homomorphisms may not be helpful in designing cryptographic protocols, our modification is quite reasonable. Second, our definition requires only the existence of G t and homomorphisms while Freeman required them to be output [15] . Since our definition is weaker than Freeman's (if we ignore our first modification), our main results (the lower bounds and optimal construction) are meaningful. Several other researchers [25, 24] have used an existence definition like ours instead of Freeman's definition for the projecting property.
Subgroup Decision Assumption and k-Linear Assumption
Here we define subgroup decision problem and subgroup decision assumption in the bilinear group setting, which were introduced by Freeman [15] . Definition 3 Let G be a bilinear group generator. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the subgroup decision problem on the left, denoted by Adv
We say that G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption on the left if, for any PPT algorithm A, its Adv
is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
We analogously define the subgroup decision problem on the right, the advantage Adv
of A, and the subgroup decision assumption on the right by using H and H 1 instead of G and G 1 .
Definition 4
We say that a bilinear group generator G satisfies the subgroup decision assumption if G satisfies both the subgroup decision assumptions on the left and subgroup decision assumptions on the right.
For a subgroup decision assumption in the prime-order group setting, we use the widely-known k-linear assumption which is introduced by Hofheinz and Kiltz and Shacham [23, 36] , in the bilinear group setting. We give the formal definition of k-linear assumption below.
Definition 5 Let G 1 be a bilinear group generator of prime order and k ≥ 1. We define the advantage of an algorithm A in solving the k-linear problem in G, denoted by Adv
Then, we say that G 1 satisfies the k-linear assumption in G if for any PPT algorithm A, Adv
is a negligible function of the security parameter.
We can analogously define the k-linear assumption in H. The 1-linear assumption in G is the DDH assumption in G and the 2-linear assumption in G is the decisional linear assumption in G [9] .
Impossibility Results of Projecting Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we first formally define natural product groups of prime-order bilinear groups. Next, we derive conditions for projecting bilinear groups, and then provide our impossibility results of projecting bilinear pairings. We begin by defining some notations that will help us to simplify explanations. For group elements
, and
).
From this notation, we can easily obtain (g
Bilinear Groups Naturally Induced from k-linear Assumption
In Figure 1 , we provide a generator G
When we refer to the natural construction of product groups of prime-order bilinear groups such that the subgroup decision assumption "naturally" follows from the k-linear assumption, we mean G {A } ∈ [1,m] k . 4 When we consider the subgroup decision assumption, which is induced from the k-linear assumption, to mean that, given g, it is hard to determine if g 
Note that
contains Groth-Sahai's constructions based on the DDH assumption (k = 1) and the DLIN assumption (k = 2). 4 Meiklejohn et al. [25] also used the word "natural" to refer to G
to show the limitation result of both projecting and cancelling: They showed that for any A matrices used in G
cannot be both projecting and cancelling with overwhelming probability, where the probability goes over the randomness used in G
takes the security parameter λ as input.
Run
such that the set { − → x i}i∈ [1,k] and { − → y i}i∈ [1,k] are each linearly independent. 5. Randomly choose generators g ∈ G and h ∈ H, and let
6. Define a map e : G × H → Gt as an m-tuple of maps e(·, ·) for ∈ [1, m] as follows:
7. Output description of (p, G, G1, H, H1, Gt, e); each group description has its generators only. (e.g., G1's description has g
Conditions for Bilinearity and Non-degeneracy
A bilinear pairing e of G
in Figure 1 can be rewritten, using matrix notation, as
where − → x is considered to be a 1 × (k + 1) matrix, and − → y t is considered to be a (k + 1) × 1 matrix.
Theorem 2 Let e be a map generated by G
Proof. The bilinearity of e comes directly from the bilinearity ofê and the definition of e.
Theorem 3 Let e be a map generated by G
. Let V c and V r be vector spaces over F p spanned by all column vectors and all row vectors of {A } ∈ [1,m] , respectively. Then, e is non-degenerate if and only if both dimensions of V c and V r are equal to (k + 1).
where 1 t is the identity of G t . Therefore, e is degenerate. Similarly, if dim(V r ) < k + 1, then there exists a non-zero vector
(⇐) Suppose that e is degenerate. Then, there exists a non-zero vector
show that if such a vector − → x exists, then dim(V c ) < k + 1, and if such a vector − → y exists, then dim(V r ) < k + 1. Suppose that there exists a non-zero vector
r is a non-trivial subspace so that dim(V r ) < k + 1.
Conditions for Symmetric Property
If G 1 is a symmetric bilinear group generator of prime-order, then one may think that G
is also a symmetric bilinear group generator. However, not all bilinear groups with underlying symmetric bilinear pairingsê do satisfy symmetric property. The following theorem shows the necessary and sufficient condition of {A } ∈ [1,m] 
to be symmetric; that is, e(g, h) = e(h, g) for any group elements g and h.
Suppose that A is symmetric; That is
Necessary Condition for Projection Property
Using a tensor product ⊗, we can further simplify e computation as follows: Let B be a (k + 1)
From now, we use a notation G to denote a bilinear group generator naturally induced from the k-linear assumption, where B is defined by {A } ∈ [1,m] as above. This notation is well-defined since there are one-to-one correspondence between B and {A } ∈ [1,m] .
We give a necessary condition of B for G B k to be projecting in Lemma 1. This lemma says that if
should have at least an element not contained in the subgroup generated by other parts of images.
where D is the smallest group containing e(G 1 , H) and e(G, H 1 ).
where D is the smallest group containing e(G, G 1 ).
Proof. (1) Suppose that G B k is projecting. Then, there exist three homomorphisms π,π, and π t . Since π and π are non-trivial homomorphisms, G 1 and H 1 are proper subgroups of G and H, respectively. Since G 1 and H 1 are proper subgroups, for any decompositions
We show that G 1 , G 2 , H 1 , and H 2 satisfy the condition in the theorem. By definition of D, D is a group generated by all elements in e(G 1 , H) and e(G, H 1 ) so that every element in D can be written as a product of elements in e(G 1 , H) and e(G, H 1 ) (though it is not uniquely written). For any g 1 ∈ G 1 , h 1 ∈ H 1 , g ∈ G, and h ∈ H, π t (e(g 1 , h)e(g, h 1 )) is equal to 1 t since
We can see that by homomorphic property of
That is a contradiction of π t 's non-trivial condition.
(2) We can prove similarly as (1) . Essential proof idea is same as (1) . Thus, we omit it.
For our impossibility results regarding the image size and computational cost, we will focus on the (k + 1)
2 × m matrix B of G B k . All non-zero entries in B implyê-computations (bilinear pairingê of underlying bilinear group generator G 1 ) and the lower bound of m implies the lower bound of the image size of bilinear pairings. We compute the lower bound of the rank of B of G B k , where G B k is asymmetric and projecting, by using the necessary condition of projecting property in Lemma 1. For projecting symmetric bilinear pairings, the overall strategy is similar to those of projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings except that symmetric bilinear pairings have the special form of B as mentioned in Theorem 4. We give the formal statement below.
Lemma 2
The following statements about G B k are true with overwhelming probability, where the probability goes over the randomness used in the G Proof.
(1) Let G B k be a projecting asymmetric bilinear group generator. Let (G, G 1 , H, H 1 , G t , e) be the output of G B k and G and H be decomposed by G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 and H = H 1 ⊕ H 2 , respectively for some subgroups G 2 and H 2 . Then,
for some sets of linearly independent vectors { − → x i } i∈ [1,k+1] and { − → y i } i∈ [1,k+1] . Let X be a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix over F p with − → x i as its i-th row, and Y be a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix over F p with − → y i as its i-th row.
Note that X and Y are invertible. Since B is a (k + 1) 2 × m matrix for some m, B can have at most (k + 1) 2 linear independent rows. Suppose that B has less than (k + 1) 2 linearly independent rows. We observe that
and similarly
where − → e i is the i-th canonical vector of
. Now, we show that there exists a non-zero vector
The existence of such a vector − → c implies that the (k + 1)
2 -th row of (X ⊗ Y )B can be represented by the linear combination of upper rows of (X ⊗ Y )B so that e(G 2 , H 2 ) ⊂ D. Then, it would be a contradiction with Lemma 1.
By hypothesis (rank(B) < (k+1)
2 ), there exists a non-zero vector
2 -th entry is nonzero with overwhelming probability, where the probability goes over the randomness used in
We consider the (k + 1)-th column vectorx t of X −1 such thatx is orthogonal to all upper k rows of X. Denote the orthogonal complement of
. Similarly, the (k + 1)-th column vectorŷ
, and it is a non-zero constant multiple of − → r ( − → w ⊗ − → z ) t . By the first statement of Lemma 3, which is given below, − → r ( − → w ⊗ − → z ) t is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Therefore, we complete the proof of the first statement of theorem.
(2) We can prove the second statement of theorem by using the second statements of Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. The overall strategy is same as the proof of the first statement of theorem. The key observation of the proof of the second statement is that B has a special form due to Theorem 4. Let G B k be a projecting symmetric bilinear group generator, (G, G 1 , G t , e) be its output, and G be de-
. Let X be a n × n matrix over F p with − → x i as its i-th row. Note that X is invertible. We know that B has a some special form by Theorem 4 so that B has at most (k+1)(k+2) 2 linearly independent rows: Let V be a subspace of
, where − → a i,j is a vector with 1 in the (i − 1)(k + 1) + j-th entry, −1 in the (j − 1)(k + 1) + i-th entry, and zeros elsewhere. We know that
, B has at most (k+1)(k+2) 2 linear independent rows. (Recall B has (k + 1) 2 rows and (k + 1)
.) Suppose that B has linear independent rows less than
. We observe that
and similarly,
. We show that there exists a non-zero vector − → c ∈ F
with a non-zero in the (k + 1)
The existence of such a vector − → c implies that e(G 2 , G 2 ) ⊂ D. Then, it would be a contradiction with Lemma 1.
2 -th entry is non-zero, with overwhelming probability, where the probability goes over the randomness used in
, and it is a non-zero constant multiple of − → r ( − → w ⊗ − → w ) t . By the second statement of Lemma 3, − → r ( − → w ⊗ − → w ) t is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Therefore, we complete the proof of the second statement of theorem. 
For any non-zero vector
, where the probability goes over the choice of vectors − → w , − → z ∈ F k+1 p .
For any vector
, where the probability goes over the choice of a vector − → w ∈ F k+1 p .
Proof.
(1) Let − → r = (r 1,1 , . . . , r 1,k+1 , r 2,1 , . . . , r 2,k+1 , . . . , r k+1,k+1 ), − → w = (w 1 , . . . , w k+1 ), and − → z = (z 1 , . . . , z k+1 ).
polynomial of degree at most 2 over F p if we consider w 1 , . . . , w k+1 , z 1 , . . . , z k+1 as variables. By SchwartzZippel lemma, we obtain Pr[ r 1,1 , . . . , r 1,k+1 , r 2,1 , . . . , r 2,k+1 , . . . , r k+1,k+1 ), and
Since − → r ∈ V , there exists a (i, j) such that (r i,j + r j,i ) = 0. Thus, 1≤i≤j≤k+1 (r i,j + r j,i )w i w j is a non-zero polynomial of degree at most 2 over F p if we consider w 1 , . . . , w k+1 as variables. By Schwartz-Zippel lemma, we obtain Pr[
where the probability goes over the randomness for uniformly choosing t 1 , . . . , t k+1 .
Impossibility of Projecting Property
Basing on Lemma 2, we derive our main theorem on the impossibility results of projecting bilinear pairings. We begin with explaining our computational model for the lower bounds of computational cost of projecting bilinear pairings. In our computational model, we assume two things: First, one who computes projecting bilinear pairings e can not utilize the representation of the underlying bilinear pairingê and groups G, H, and G t over whichê is defined. Note that we rule out techniques for multi-pairings [34, 17] in our computational model. This assumption is same as that of the generic group model [37] , in particular, generic bilinear group [8] . In [37, 8] , the generic (bilinear) group model is used to show the computational lower bounds of attacker solving number theoretic problems such as the discrete logarithm problem and q-strong DiffieHellman problem. Second, two inputs are uniformly and independently chosen so that any relations with two inputs are unknown. In special cases such that a relation with two inputs are known, there are several alternative way to compute bilinear pairings.
6 instead of performing a bilinear pairing. Since we want to consider the computational cost of e in general without using any additional information of two inputs, we assume that two inputs are uniformly and independently distributed in their respective domains. We provide our main theorem below. ; hence, an element in
) elements in G t .
(3) First, we show that for two inputs g = (g 1 , . . . , g k+1 ) ∈ G and h = (h 1 , . . . , h k+1 ) ∈ H, projecting (asymmetric or symmetric) pairings require computing allê(g i , h j ) for all i, j ∈ [1, k + 1]. To this end, it is sufficient to show that every row in the matrix B is non-zero. 
is equal to the rank of B, every row in B has at least one non-zero entry. Next, we show that computingê(g i , h j ) cannot be generally substitute by a product of otherê(g i , h j ) for i ∈ [1, k + 1] \ {i} and j ∈ [1, k + 1] \ {j} in our computational model. To this end, it is sufficient to show that for any non-zero vector − → r = (r 1 , . . . , r (k+1
For two random inputs g
with overwhelming probability by Lemma 3, and hence we obtain the desired result such that
with overwhelming probability. Therefore, all projecting bilinear pairings require at least (k + 1) 2ê -computations.
Optimal Projecting Bilinear Pairings
In this section, we show that our lower bounds are tight; for projecting asymmetric bilinear pairing, we show that Groth-Sahai and Freeman's constructions are optimal (in our computational model), and for projecting symmetric bilinear pairing, we propose a new construction achieving optimal efficiency (in our computational model).
Definition 6 Let G B k be a projecting asymmetric (symmetric, resp.) bilinear group generator. If the bilinear pairing e consists of (k + 1)
2ê -computation in our computational model and
We can define G is optimal. Therefore, we obtain the following theorem.
is an optimal projecting asymmetric bilinear group generator. 
Optimal Projecting Symmetric Bilinear Pairings
We propose an optimal projecting symmetric bilinear group generator G B k by defining B (equivalently
Lemma 5 τ is a bijective map.
Proof. If
Otherwise, without loss of generality we assume that i < i. Then, the left-hand side is larger than or equal to i , but the right-hand side is less than i . Therefore, i = i and j = j, so that τ is injective. Since τ is injective and the size of the domain of τ and the size of the range of τ are equal, τ is surjective, too. 5 Freeman used the notation GP , which is equivalent to our notation G I 4
.
Description of A (equivalently B) for optimal projecting symmetric bilinear pairings:
is defined as a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix with 1 in the entry (i, j) and zeros elsewhere if i = j, 1 in the entries (i, j) and (j, i), and zeros elsewhere otherwise .
We give an example to easily explain the proposal. ]. (Then, we implicitly define
.) By using the matrix B, we can construct a bilinear group generator G B k . Next, we show that a group generator G B k , where B is defined as above, is an optimal projecting symmetric bilinear group generator. The following Theorem 7 provides the desired result. is an optimal projecting symmetric bilinear group generator with overwhelming probability, where the probability goes over the randomness used in G B k .
Proof. We can denote A by A i,j for τ −1 ( ) = (i, j) since τ is bijective. By definition, A i,i has 1 in only entry (i, i) and zeros elsewhere. All column vectors of {A i,i } i∈ [1,k+1] span F k+1 p and all row vectors of {A i,i } i∈ [1,k+1] span F k+1 p . Therefore, e is non-degenerate by Theorem 3. Since each A is symmetric, G 
Let X be a (k + 1) × (k + 1) matrix such that the i-th row of X is − → x i . To show that G B k is projecting, we show that e(G 2 , G 2 ) = {1 t } and e(G 2 , G 2 )∩D = {1 t }, where D is a group generated by by all elements in e(G 1 , G). Then, it is easy to check natural projections π : G → G 2 , π t : G t → e(G 2 , G 2 ) and G t := D satisfy conditions for being projecting; (1) 
, and (3) π t (e(g 1 g 2 , h 1 h 2 )) = π t (e(g 1 , h 1 )e(g 2 , h 1 )e(g 1 , h 2 ) e(g 2 , h 2 )) = e(g 2 , h 2 ) = e(π(g 1 g 2 ), π(h 1 h 2 )) for any g 1 , h 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 , h 2 ∈ G 2 . We know that
Let Z be a . By Lemma 6, D is invertible so that we obtain the desired result that e(G 2 , G 2 ) = {1 t } and e(G 2 , G 2 ) ∩ D = {1 t }.
Since for i = j, A i,j has only one non-zero entry, and for i = j A i,j has two non-zero entries, there are (k + 1) 2 non-zero entries in all {A i,j }. Since all non-zero entires are 1, e requires only (k + 1) 2ê -computations (without additional exponentiations). Therefore, the proposed G B k is optimal: that is, e requires (k + 1) We show that D's rank is
. By the definition of Z, Z is a part of X ⊗ X (in the sense that each row of Z is also row of X ⊗ X). LetZ be a
× (k + 1) matrix, which is a disjoint part of X ⊗ X from Z. By the definition of B, a rank of (X ⊗ X)B is equal to that of D. (By definition of B, for each row
(by the definition of B) and X ⊗ X's rank is (k + 1) 2 (by the property of the tensor product). Therefore,
so that the rank of D is also
; Hence, D is invertible.
Our definition of projecting requires only the existence of homomorphisms satisfying some conditions. However, some applications (e.g., Boneh-Goh-Nissim cryptosystem [10, 15] ) require that such homomorphisms are efficiently computable. We provide the way how to construct efficiently computable homomorphisms (precisely, natural projections) satisfying projecting property. Let
such that − → x 1 , . . . , − → x k+1 are linearly independent vectors in F k+1 p
. We construct two projections π : G → G 2 and π t : G t → e(G 2 , G 2 ). Let U be a (k + 1) × (k + 1) diagonal matrix with 1 in the entry (k + 1, k + 1) and zeros elsewhere, and V be a . Now, we show that π and π t are projections. Every element g ∈ G can be written as g i∈ [1,k+1] 
Therefore, π is a projection to G 2 . Similarly, element g t ∈ G t can be written as e(g, g)
Therefore, π t is a projection to e(G 2 , G 2 ). From the relation G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 , we know that elements g , g in G can be uniquely written as g = g 1 g 2 and g = g 1 g 2 , where g 1 , g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 , g 2 ∈ G 2 . Then,
so π, π t , and G t := D, where D is the smallest subgroup containing e(G, G 1 ), satisfy the projecting property. The first equality follows from the bilinearity of e, the second follows from the definition of π t , and the third follows from the definition of π.
Example 2. For k = 2, we can construct an optimal projecting symmetric bilinear group generator by using the matrices in example 1. We denote such a bilinear group generator by G B * 2 , where B * is a 9 × 6 matrix defined by the A 1 , . . . , A 6 matrices in example 1. 
is optimal projecting symmetric: Since B * is a 9 × 6 matrix, the target group G t is equal to G 6 t . Moreover, B * has nine 1's in the entries and zeros elsewhere so that bilinear pairing e requires 9ê-computations (without any exponentiations).
Application
On the basis of our optimal projecting symmetric bilinear pairings, we derive new instantiations of three distinct cryptosystems with improved efficiency. In particular, we apply the projecting symmetric bilinear group generator G B * 2 in the example 2 for the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system, the Boneh-GohNissim Cryptosystem, and the Seo-Cheon round optimal Blind signature scheme.
Groth-Sahai Non-Interactive Proof System under DLIN Assumption
We create a new instantiation of the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system for several types of quadratic equations [22] . The proposed instantiation uses G B * 2 in example 2, which is symmetric and projecting. Since G B * 2 is optimal (in the sense of Definition 6), our instantiation provides efficient verification algorithms. (In Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system, the bilinear pairing operations and the exponentiations in G t are used to verify the proofs.)
First we review the formal definition of non-interactive proof system for the Groth-Sahai proofs. Let R be a ternary relation consists of the setup gk, the statement x and the witness w. In our instantiation, gk is a bilinear group description. We let L be the language consisting of statements x with a witness w in R for a given some gk. The Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system consists of four algorithms: a setup algorithm Setup, a common reference string (CRS) generation algorithm K, a prover P, and a verifier V. The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input and outputs a setup (gk, sk). In our instantiation, sk is empty string. 6 The CRS generation algorithm K takes (gk, sk) as input and outputs a CRS σ. The prover P takes (gk, σ, x, w) as input and outputs a proof Θ. The verifier V takes (gk, σ, x, Θ) and outputs 1 if the proof Θ is acceptable and 0 otherwise. We say these four algorithms (Setup, K, P, V) are a non-interactive proof system for the relation R with setup algorithm Setup if it satisfies the following definitions of the completeness and soundness properties.
Definition 7
We say that (Setup, K, P, V) is perfectly complete if for all adversaries A,
Definition 8 We say that (Setup, K, P, V) is perfectly sound if for all adversaries A,
We give the definition of non-interactive proof system with composable witness-indistinguishability.
Definition 9
We say that (Setup, K, P, V) is composable witness-indistinguishable if there exists a probability polynomial time simulator S, such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries A,
is negligible in the security parameter, and for all adversaries A
.
The common reference string generated by K contains soundness string and the description of imbedding functions and the commitment schemes. The simulated common reference string generated by S consists of witness-indistinguishability (WI) string and the description of imbedding functions and the commitment schemes. We describe Setup, soundness string, WI string, imbedding functions and commitment schemes below.
, where g is a generator of G and G = G 3 . and set gk = (p, G, G 1 , G t , e, g 2 ).
Soundness string
On input gk, set σ = (p, G, G 1 , G t , e, u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ), where
Note that G 2 ∩ G 1 = {1 G } (with overwhelming probability), and in the soundness setting G 2 ∩ G 1 = {1 G } (with overwhelming probability). Imbedding functions ι G2 , ι G 2 , ι e(G2,G2) , ι e(G2,G 2 ) and ι e(G 2 ,G 2 ) are group homomorphisms, where we consider G, G t , G, G t as multiplicative groups, and F p as an additive group.
Lemma 7
If the soundness string is given, the commitment schemes C G2 and C G 2 are perfectly binding, and if the witness-indistinguishability string is given, C G2 and C G 2 are perfectly hiding.
Proof. In the soundness setting, suppose that for some
In the soundness setting, suppose that for some
x−y . Since u 3 g 2 ∈ G 1 , we obtain x = y. Therefore, C G 2 is perfectly binding. In the witness-indistinguishability setting, C G2 (X ) is uniformly distributed in G regardless of X since u 1 , u 2 , and u 3 span G. In the witness-indistinguishability setting, C G 2 (x) is uniformly distributed in G 1 regardless of x since u 1 and u 2 span G 1 , and ι G 2 (x) = u x 3 ∈ G 1 . Therefore, C G2 and C G 2 are perfectly hiding.
We give a non-interactive proof system for the following equation
where
and commitments C S1 (X i ) and C S2 (Y j ) are given. This equation covers all equations considered in [22] . In the next subsection, we show that this equation implies a pairing product equation, a multi-scalar multiplication equation in G, and a quadratic equation in F p .
Proof:
The prover takes the common reference string (imbedding functions, commitment schemes, and σ) and witness {X i } i∈ [1,µ] , {Y j } j∈ [1,ν] as inputs. Then, the prover does as follows.
Commit to
, and r j1 , r j2 , r j3
← F p and make a proof (Θ 1 , Θ 2 , Θ 3 ) as follows.
For notational convenience, let
. Return a proof − → Θ for the satisfiability of the equation (1).
Verification:
Given committed values {C S1 (X i )} i∈ [1,µ] , {C S2 (Y j )} j∈ [1,ν] and a proof
and accept the proof if and only if it holds. We call the above equation by the verification equation.
We show that the above non-interactive proof system satisfies perfect completeness (no matter σ is the soundness string or the witness-indistinguishability string), perfect soundness (where σ is the soundness string), and composable witness-indistinguishability.
Theorem 8
The above protocol satisfies perfect completeness.
Proof. We show that an honestly generated proof − → Θ will be accepted. On substituting C S1 (X i ) and C S2 (Y j ) in the left-hand side of the verification equation with
The first equality due to the statement equation (1) .
2 ) in Θ 3 are used to blind other factors. On defining Θ 1 , Θ 2 , Θ 3 by removing these blinding factors from Θ 1 , Θ 2 , Θ 3 , we can check that Θ 1 , Θ 2 , Θ 3 will also satisfy perfect completeness.
Theorem 9
The above protocol satisfies perfect soundness.
Proof. When σ is the soundness string, u 1 , u 2 , u 3 are chosen from G 1 so that where D is the smallest group containing e(G 1 , G) . Since G B * 2 is projecting, we obtain that e(G 2 , G 2 ) ⊂ D by Lemma 1. This implies that e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊂ D no matter whether S 1 , S 2 ∈ {G 2 , G 2 }. Since e(S 1 , S 2 ) is a cyclic group of order p, we obtain G t = e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊕ D.
Since G t = e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊕ D, we can define a natural projection π e(S1,S2) from G t to e(S 1 , S 2 ) by g t g t → g t , where g t ∈ e(S 1 , S 2 ) and g t ∈ D. (Since G t = e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊕ D, every element in G t can be uniquely written as g t g t for some g t ∈ e(S 1 , S 2 ) and g t ∈ D.)
Suppose that the verification equation holds. By applying π e(S1,S2) in the left-hand side of the verification equation, we obtain that π e(S1,S2) (
The equality follows from the fact that G t = e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊕ D. (Note that C S (·) consists of a product of an element in S and an element in G 1 , and for all g 1 , g 1 ∈ G 1 , e(ι S1 (·), g 1 ), e(g 1 , ι S2 (·)), e(g 1 , g 1 ) ∈ D ⊂ ker(π e(S1,S2) ).) Applying π e(S1,S2) in the right-hand side of the verification equation, we get π e(S1,S2) (ι e(S1,S2) (Z)
The equality also follows from the fact that G t = e(S 1 , S 2 ) ⊕ D and π e(S1,S2) is a projection to e(S 1 , S 2 ). We applied π e(S1,S2) in the both sides of the verification equation. The result equation implies that the desired statement equation (1) .
satisfies the subgroup decision assumption, then the common reference string in the soundness setting is computationally indistinguishable from the common reference string in the witnessindistinguishability setting.
Proof. We can prove by using the standard hybrid argument. Define Game 1 , Game 2 , and Game 3 as follows.
In
The subgroup decision assumption gives us the indistinguishability between Game 1 and Game 2 , and the indistinguishability between Game 2 and Game 3 . By the hybrid argument, Game 1 and Game 3 are indistinguishable by the subgroup decision assumption. Since Game 1 is identical to the soundness setting and Game 3 is identical to the witness-indistinguishability setting, we conclude the desired result.
Lemma 9 Let (Θ 1 , Θ 2 , Θ 3 ) be a special solution of an equation
is CRS in the witness-indistinguishability setting, and X 1 , X 2 and X 3 are variables. For
Proof. In the witness-indistinguishability setting, G = u 1 , u 2 , u 3 and {e(u i , u j )} 1≤i≤j≤3 is basis of F pmodule G t . (Recall that G t 's rank is 6.) Therefore, g t can be uniquely written as g t = 1≤i≤j≤3 e(u i , u j ) αij for some α ij ∈ F p . Re-define a variable X i := u
by using variables u
α11 , e(u 1 , u
2 )e(u 2 , u
1 ) = e(u 1 , u 2 ) α12 , e(u 1 , u
3 )e(u 3 , u
2 ) = e(u 2 , u 2 ) α22 , e(u 2 , u
2 ) = e(u 2 u 3 ) α23 , e(u 3 , u
3 ) = e(u 3 , u 3 ) α33 .
Therefore, u
1 , u
2 , u
3 are fixed and there are p 3 solutions in the solution set. We can easily check that for each different tuple (
is a different solution by the fact that (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 ) is a basis of F p -module G. Since there are p 3 number of
2 )) is uniformly distributed in the solution set.
Theorem 10
The above protocol satisfies composable witness-indistinguishability.
Proof. Under the decisional linear assumption, G B * 2 satisfies subgroup decision assumption by Theorem 1. By Lemma 8 the soundness string is computationally indistinguishable from the WI string. When the simulated common reference string generated by S is given, C Si is perfectly hiding. By Lemma 9, a proof − → Θ is uniformly distributed in a solution set of the verification equation. Therefore, the committed values and the proof always have identical distribution regardless of the witness.
Size-reduced non-interactive proof system when S 1 = S 2 = G 2 : If S 1 = S 2 = G 2 , then we can reduce the size of a proof by removing Θ 3 and slightly changing blinding factors in Θ 1 and Θ 2 . Suppose that
1 )), and modify a verification equation to contain only Θ 1 and Θ 2 as follows.
Then, similar arguments show that this protocol is also a non-interactive proof system with composable witness-indistinguishability for satisfiability of a quadratic equation over bilinear groups where the decisional linear assumption holds. Key observation of this size-reduced non-interactive proof system when S 1 = S 2 = G 2 is that (1) Θ 3 contains only blinding factors (r i3 = r j3 = 0), and (2) the images of ι G 2 and C G 2 are contained in G 1 in the witness-indistinguishability setting. Therefore, we can (independently) blind Θ 1 and Θ 2 by using only u 1 and u 2 instead of u 1 , u 2 and u 3 .
Note that by applying similar method of extending from the original Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system with composable witness-indistinguishability for a quadratic equation to the one for a set of quadratic equations, ours for a quadratic equation can be extend to the one for a set of quadratic equations. Furthermore, we can also obtain a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a set of quadratic equations by similar method as Groth-Sahai's.
Verification Complexity: For verification, µν exponentiations in G t , µν + µ + ν + 3 e-computations are required (if we ignore costs for multiplications in G t and evaluations of imbedding functions). For each exponentiation in G t and each e-computation, they cost 6 exponentiations in G t and 9ê-computations, respectively. Therefore, in total 6µν exponentiations in G t and 9(µν + µ + ν + 3) pairing computations are required for verifying a quadratic equation.
Comparison with Instantiation of Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system under DLIN: The proposed instantiation is similar to the Groth-Sahai's instantiation 3 (based on the DLIN assumption) since both follow the module-based abstraction of the Groth-Sahai proof system. The biggest differences are bilinear pairing e and the target group G t . Groth and Sahai implicitly used a bilinear group generator that differs from ours.
7 They define a symmetric bilinear pairing e by using an asymmetric bilinear pairingē as follows:
t , whereē is defined by using a 9 × 9 identity matrix (i.e., e is the output of Freeman's asymmetric projecting bilinear group G I9 2 ). They implicitly used a matrix B to define the bilinear group generator: 
However, we can improve the efficiency of the Groth-Sahai's symmetric bilinear pairing, though they do not mention how to improve efficiency of their construction. Since the second column and fourth column are equal, the third column and seventh column are equal, and the sixth column and eighth column are equal, we can remove the fourth, seventh, and eighth columns from B. Then, the resulting matrix has 6 columns and nine non-zero entries. Since the number of non-zero entries corresponds to the number ofê-computations, the resulting bilinear map costs 9ê-computations. The 1/2 entries represent exponentiation, so that the resulting bilinear map requires 6 additional exponentiations in G t . (A map e in G B * 2 , which is used in our protocol, costs only 9ê-computations and has no exponentiations in G t .) Therefore, the verification of the proposed protocol is slightly faster than that of the Groth-Sahai's DLIN instantiation. All components in a proof are elements in G. Therefore, the size of the proof and the computational cost of the prover of the proposed protocol are the same as those of the Groth-Sahai's protocol.
Additional Details for Groth-Sahai Proofs
We show that the following equation implies a pairing product equation, a multi-scalar multiplication equation in G, and a quadratic equation in F p .
Pairing product equation. Set S 1 = S 2 = G 2 . The image of e(·, ·) consists of 6 elements in G t . The equation (2) implies entry-wise equations in G t , that is, 6 equations in G t . We only focus on the last 6-th entry of the equation (2) . By definition of e, we know that e((1
t . Therefore, by definition of ι G2 and ι e(G2,G2) , we obtain from the 6-th entry of the equation (2) the desired pairing product equation
where A j , B i ∈ G, Z ∈ G t , γ ij ∈ F p are constants and X i , Y j ∈ G are variables.
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Multi-scalar multiplication equation in G. Set S 1 = G 2 and S 2 = G 2 . We know that every element in the equation (2) is contained in e(G 2 , G 2 ), which is a cyclic group of order p, by definitions of ι G2 , ι G 2 , and ι e(G2,G 2 ) . Thus, we can take discrete logarithms of both sides of the equation (2) based on e(g 2 , u 3 g 2 ) ∈ e(G 2 , G 2 ). For A j , X i , Z ∈ G, these group elements uniquely determine field elements a j ,
If we compute the discrete logarithm of the equation (2) based on e(g 2 , u 3 g 2 ), then we obtain
This equation implies a multi-scalar multiplication equation in a cyclic group G of order p.
where A j , Z ∈ G, B i , γ ij ∈ F p are constants and X i ∈ G, Y j ∈ F p are variables.
We know that both sides of the equation (2) is contained in e(G 2 , G 2 ), which is a cyclic group of order p. Thus, we can take discrete logarithms based on e(u 3 g 2 , u 3 g 2 ). If we compute the discrete logarithm of the equation (2) based on e(g 2 , g 2 ), then we obtain a quadratic equation in
where A j , B i , Z, γ ij ∈ F p are constants and X i , Y j ∈ F p are variables. 
Boneh-Goh-Nissim Cryptosystem under DLIN Assumption
Our second application of the optimal projecting symmetric bilinear pairings is the partially doubly homomorphic encryption scheme (BGN encryption scheme) of Boneh, Goh, and Nissim [10] . Given two ciphertexts, anyone can create a new ciphertext that encrypts the sum of two corresponding plaintexts. That is, the BGN encryption scheme is additive homomorphic. In addition, the BGN encryption scheme supports one multiplication (followed by arbitrary additions) of encrypted values. Since the BGN encryption scheme allows only one multiplication, we call it "partially doubly homomorphic" encryption scheme. We give our instantiation of the BGN encryption scheme, which is proven secure under the DLIN assumption, in Figure 2 . Our instantiation uses the projecting symmetric bilinear group generator G B * 2 in the example 2. Note that G B * 2 supports random samplings from G and G 1 ; The description of G (G 1 , resp.) contains a basis of G (G 1 , resp.), and linear combinations of basis with random coefficients are random elements in G (G 1 , resp.). Furthermore, one can randomly samples from D; For example, D = e(u 1 , u 1 ), e(u 1 , u 2 ), e(u 1 , g), e(u 2 , u 2 ), e(u 2 , g) , where G 1 = u 1 , u 2 and G = G 1 ⊕ g . Thus, linear combinations of e(u 1 , u 1 ), e(u 1 , u 2 ), e(u 1 , g), e(u 2 , u 2 ), and e(u 2 , g) with random coefficients are random elements in D. Note that G = G 1 ⊕ G 2 and G t = e(G 2 , G 2 ) ⊕ D, and π and π t satisfy the projecting property with G t = D.
For a ciphertext CT , if CT ∈ G, information about the corresponding plaintext M is contained in the exponent of π(g). If CT ∈ G t , then the corresponding plaintext information is contained in the exponent of e(π(g), π(g)) = π t (e (g, g) ). For ciphertexts CT 1 and CT 2 , we can see that the output of Add contains the addition of messages of CT 1 and CT 2 either in the exponent of π(g) (if both ciphertexts are in G) or in the exponent of π t (e(g, g)) (if both ciphertexts are in G t ). Further, we can see that the output of Multiply contains the multiplication of two input ciphertexts in the exponent of π t (e (g, g) ). The correctness of decryption algorithm directly follows from the fact that CT contains the corresponding plaintext information either in the exponent of π(g) (if CT ∈ G) or in the exponent of π t (e(g, g)) (if CT ∈ G t ).
The semantic security of our instantiation of BGN cryptosystem follows from the subgroup decision assumption in G. In a ciphertext CT ∈ G, a blinding factor g ∈ G 1 is indistinguishable from the element randomly chosen from G; Thus, CT is indistinguishable from an uniform element in G so that it leaks no information about the corresponding plaintext. The semantic security of ciphertexts in G t follows from the semantic security of two input ciphertexts in G. G, G 1 , G t , e) , where G = G 3 . , 1 G , g ) ∈ G and G 2 = g 2 . Let D be the smallest group containing e(G, G 1 ). Define π : G → G 2 and π t : G t → e(G 2 , G 2 ) by g 1 g 2 → g 2 and g t g t → g t , where g 1 ∈ G 1 , g 2 ∈ G 2 , g t ∈ D, and g t ∈ e(G 2 , G 2 ).
Choose g $ ← G. Output P K = {p, G, G 1 , G t , e, g} and SK = {π, π t }. If CT 1 , CT 2 ∈ G t , then choose g t $ ← D, and output the ciphertext CT 1 · CT 2 · g t ∈ G t . Decrypt(SK, CT ) If CT ∈ G, then output the ciphertext log π(g) (π(CT )). If CT ∈ G t , then output the ciphertext log πt(e(g,g)) (π t (CT )).
Fig. 2. BGN encryption scheme under DLIN assumption
Comparison with Freeman's Instantiation of the BGN cryptosystem under DLIN: Freeman proposed an instantiation of the BGN cryptosystem under k-linear assumption. In his construction, he used the projecting asymmetric bilinear pairing e defined over G × H so that the size of G t = G n 2 t . Although Freeman used the asymmetric bilinear group generator, the underlying group generator G 1 can be symmetric; That is, a mapê generated by G 1 is a symmetric pairing. If G 1 is symmetric, for a bilinear pairing e used in Freeman's construction of projecting asymmetric bilinear pairings one can compute both e(g, h) and e(h, g) but e(g, h) = e(h, g). Thus, we call e is asymmetric. The original BGN cryptosystem in composite-order bilinear groups uses a symmetric bilinear pairing, and in some applications the symmetric property of a (underlying) bilinear pairing would be useful to design protocols. When Freeman's instantiation of the BGN cryptosystem uses a symmetric pairingê in the underlying prime-order group generator G 1 , each ciphertext consists of 1 element in either G or G t . That is, a ciphertext consists of either 3 elements in G or 9 elements in G t . Therefore, our instantiation of the BGN cryptosystem under DLIN assumption has smaller ciphertexts size than that of Freeman's. In addition, the better efficiency of our Apply algorithm and Decrypt algorithm follow from the fact that our protocol's ciphertext size is shorter than Freeman's.
Seo-Cheon Round Optimal Blind Signatures under DLIN Assumption
The proposed projecting symmetric bilinear pairings can be used for efficient instantiation of the Seo-Cheon round optimal blind signature scheme under DLIN assumption [35] . Seo-Cheon's scheme uses Groth-Sahai's projecting symmetric bilinear pairings. Furthermore, they define a new property, called translating, and showed that the Groth-Sahai's symmetric construction satisfies translating property. In the proof of their scheme, both projecting and translating properties are essentially used. Our construction for projecting symmetric bilinear pairings also satisfies the translating property.
Definition 10 (translating) G is a bilinear group generator. We say that G is (i, j)-translating if there exists efficiently computable maps T i,j : G 2 i × G j → G j defined by (g i , g a i , g j ) → g a j for an integer a ∈ Z, where G = ⊕ i∈ [1,k+1] G i .
When we compare the proposed symmetric bilinear pairing with that of Groth-Sahai, both constructions for projecting symmetric bilinear pairings have the same domain and range (if we slightly modify the range of the Groth-Sahai's construction for efficiency improvement as aforementioned). Only bilinear pairing computation is different between ours and the Groth-Sahai's construction for projecting symmetric bilinear pairings. The definition of translating is only associated with G. Therefore, we can similarly show that our construction also satisfies translating property as the proof given in [35] .
When we use G B * 2 (λ) instead of G SP (λ, 3), which is given in [35] , we can improve efficiency of interactions and the resulting signatures. During each interaction between a user and a signer, the signer verifies GS proofs by using bilinear pairings. The resulting signatures are Waters signatures [38] so that the verification algorithm uses bilinear pairings. Since G B * 2 (λ) generates more efficient bilinear pairings than G SP (λ, 3), we can improve efficiency in the both cases using bilinear pairings.
